



THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL 
MODEL 




The regulation of financial markets generates very relevant consequences for 
inequality and produces important distributional effects. First, public funds used to 
restore financial stability and to rescue troubled financial institutions cannot be 
assigned to finance better infrastructures or health care. Second, financial crises 
destabilize productive industries, reduce investment and increase unemployment, 
deteriorating more sharply the welfare of the weaker sections of the population. 
Third, depending on the regulatory framework, consumers and retail investors 
may see their position weakened or suffer unexpected losses more easily. Thus it is 
obvious that the regulation of financial markets significantly conditions the social 
model. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is not necessary to determine precisely if there 
exist one or several European social models. There is a rich scholarly debate1 on 
the content of this expression that could lead us to identify some differences 
between European countries, but also some common features: universal education 
and ample coverage of public health services, wide unemployment benefits 
(compared to the US or the Asian countries), strong presence of the state in the 
marketplace guaranteeing the defense of public interests, and an independent 
judicial system that protects fundamental rights (including consumer rights). It is 
in relation to these common characteristics that we refer to the European social 
model. This setting suffices to frame our research on the distributional effects of 
financial market regulation, its fairness and its consequences for the maximization 
of social welfare in Europe. More specifically, we try to find out whether the reform 
of financial market regulation in the last decade has eroded the European social 
model or, rather on the contrary, contributed to safeguarding its main 
achievements.2 
 
                                                        
1 Adnett and Hardy distinguish in post-war Western Europe four main social models: the traditional 
model (few labor regulations and redistributive mechanisms with religious entities and family 
substituting state’s social services in many instances), the liberal-individualist model (flexible labor 
markets, conditioned unemployment allowances and supremacy of freedom of contract), the 
Romano-Germanic legal tradition (strong market and labor regulation with almost universal social 
safety nets as regards health care and redistribution of income), and the social democratic model 
(strong protection of workers, tripartite decision-making in the marketplace and universal social 
benefits) (Nick Adnett/ Stephen Hardy, The European Social Model. Modernisation or Evolution 
(Edward Elgar 2005) 21-29). For a debate on the notion of European Social Model see Steve 
Corbett/ Alan Walker, ‘Between Neoliberalism and Nationalist Populism: What Role for the 
‘European Social Model’ and Social Quality in Post-Brexit Europe?’, 18(1) Social Policy and Society 
93-106 (2019); Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente, ‘Crisis, Post-crisis y Estado de Bienestar: ¿hacia 
dónde transita el Modelo Social Europeo?’, 54 Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto 121-154 (2016); 
Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead (Ed.), The European Social Model in Crisis: Is Europe Losing its Soul? 
(Edward Elgar 2015); Dagmar Schiek (Ed.): The EU Economic and Social Model in the Global Crisis 
(Routledge 2013). 
2 Christoph Hermann, ‘Crisis, structural reform and the dismantling of the European Social 




In the sphere of international economic cooperation, the prejudice that politicians 
should leave the lead to economists, to technicians, has deep roots, above all in the 
financial world that is a particularly complex biosphere. The discourse that makes 
the notion of democracy compatible with the technocratic government of certain 
aspects of community life has been theorized under the concept of ‘expert 
democracy’.3 However, in this chapter we take the view that the aseptic separation 
between technical decisions and political values is impossible in practice. In our 
perspective, the technical regulation of markets is not objective because any 
decision supposedly "technical" responds to a political approach and has social 
consequences (positive and/or negative). In short, any economic rule derives from 
a prior political approach and responds to a social model. 
 
Today, the main normative decisions for the regulation of European financial 
markets are taken by the EU. However, when drafting its norms, it often applies 
standards previously agreed at an international level. Therefore, in order to 
identify the political choices and the interests embedded in this legislation, we 
examine the way in which financial regulation is produced in general and the 
degree in which fairness and maximization of social welfare are taken (or not) into 
account (section II). Subsequently, we analyze how European financial norms and 
decisions are made and we pay special attention to the mechanisms of democratic 
control established in the EU in order to evaluate if this normative output reflects 
the distributional preferences of the citizenry (section III). After this critical review 
of financial regulatory processes both at the general and European levels, we study 
three paradigmatic examples of financial reform (the recovery and resolution of 
banks, the financial transaction tax and the limits on the remuneration of financial 
executives) that epitomized a promise made by the public authorities to the 
population after the 2008 crisis: taxpayers will not have to bear the heavy burden 
of rescuing failing financial undertakings to avoid the collapse of the capital market 
in the future, credit institutions and investment firms will have to compensate the 
social effort made to redress the financial crisis, and executives will not enjoy extra 
remuneration in spite of having ruined their financial undertaking (section IV). 
This analysis will allow us to evaluate if the distributional effects of these reforms 
suffice to talk of a social market economy that is coherent with the core elements 
of the European social model (section V). 
 
II. Regulating Financial Markets 
 
In this section we will explore the special characteristics of the normative 
production that regulates financial markets. This analysis is applicable at the state, 
                                                        
3 Vibert explains that in today’s complex societies it is impossible for the great majority of citizens 
to have access to the empirical knowledge and the understanding of the information that is needed 
to make decisions in many fields of governance. When decisions are based on empirical facts and 
not on political values, safeguarding the independence of the agencies taking such decisions would 
lead to a better regulatory output. In that context, the legitimacy and quality of the regulatory 
production of public agencies would be better served through the direct contact with 
citizens/stakeholders rather than with political interference (Frank Vibert, The Rise of the Unelected 
(CUP 2007), in particular chapters 6 and 7. See also Cathrine Holst (Ed.), Expertise and Democracy, 






European and international levels, but we will pay particular attention to the 
international dimension of this regulatory output. This will help us to better 
understand the framework in which EU financial legislation operates. 
 
2.1. The technocratic isolation of financial rule-makers 
 
The regulation of financial markets has traditionally been the preserve of an elite 
of highly skilled professionals that often crosses the revolving doors between the 
standard setting bodies and the financial firms, because the inside experience in 
the financial markets is deemed necessary to perform properly this normative 
task. 
 
International rules are drafted in standard setting bodies of limited geographical 
composition4 that work with lack of transparency and weak accountability tools. 
For example, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) which is the main network 
coordinating international financial institutions, central banks and international 
(and national) financial regulatory bodies is accountable to the G-20, an informal 
cooperation body that is not suited for a detailed control of normative activities. 
The lack of transparency in the FSB’s work makes the democratic control of the 
political choices driving its regulatory output even more difficult.5 While large 
international financial organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund 
[IMF] or the World Bank) have substantially increased their transparency and 
their interaction with civil society organizations in recent years, the standard 
setting bodies coordinated by the FSB (such as the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision or the International Organization of Securities Commissions) continue 
to perform their regulatory task far from parliamentary debates or the scrutiny of 
the mass media. 
 
The analysis of this normative output’s legitimacy goes beyond the traditional 
dialectic in international law between the Executives’ autonomy in the drafting on 
international rules and its parliamentary control. In the case of financial standards, 
highly sophisticated technocrats substitute the politicians as state representatives 
and there is usually little (if any) change in their positions derived from the 
evolution of the parliamentary majority in their home country.6 Only the biggest 
players (both the countries with the main capital markets and leading financial 
firms) in the capital market can exert a real influence in the rule-making result of 
these international bodies. 
                                                        
4 Some of these institutions have created regional groups to reach out to non-members and widen 
the geographical scope of their activities (e.g. the FSB established in 2011 six regional consultative 
groups). However, this move has more to do with their interest in disseminating their standards 
and adapting them to the circumstances of specific regions than with providing those third 
countries with a real influence in the standard setting process. De facto, it is often close to technical 
assistance (see e.g. FSB Regional Consultative Group for Sub-Saharan Africa, Working Group on 
Home-Host Cooperation and Information Sharing: Initial findings, 26 January 2018 available at 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P260118.pdf). 
5 Luis M. Hinojosa-Martínez, ‘Transparency in International Financial Institutions’, in A. Bianchi/A. 
Peters, Transparency in International Law (CUP 2013) 106-109. 
6 Camilo Soto Crespo, ‘Explaining the Financial Stability Board: Path Dependency and Zealous 
Regulatory Apprehension’, 5 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 302-327 (2017) at 
324; Chris Brummer, ‘How International Financial Law Works’, 99 Georgetown Law Journal 257 





It is true that these standards take the form of non-compulsory codes of conduct, 
but they receive the political support of the G-20 and the most important financial 
institutions. In practice, they are usually implemented with minor adaptations by 
national legislators and thus become the hard law regulating financial markets. 
This allows us to speak of a worldwide technocratic law regulating global financial 
markets. 
 
Political parties in democratic countries have not given great relevance to the 
debate on the regulation of financial markets except perhaps in the worst period of 
the recent financial crisis and in the countries more punished by its consequences.7 
The discussion of the kind of safety nets that ought to be established to make 
banks more resilient or on the appropriate limits to short selling in stock 
exchanges, for example, are usually absent from parliamentary debates. Most 
politicians find themselves uncomfortable when engaging in such deliberations 
and think that those complex technical arguments will not be understood by most 
of their potential electors (and are therefore worthless). This favors remitting the 
regulatory tasks to financial ‘experts’. 
 
The relevance of self-regulation further reinforces the aseptic normative isolation 
of the financial world. In the liberal Anglo-Saxon tradition traders and bankers 
established through contracts and professional societies the normative framework 
for the development of their business with little intervention from the state. The 
Central Bank was considered more as the primus inter pares among the merchant 
banks, with an advisory rather than a disciplinary role and a function of defense of 
the main capitalists’ interests from political interference.8 The great Anglo-Saxon 
influence in the configuration of modern capital markets9 helps us to understand 
the importance of self-regulation in this field, and provides a rationale that justifies 
leaving the regulation of money markets to their participants and keeping them 
safe from narrow-minded politicians with short-term interests. 10  The self-
regulation of international financial markets is achieved in two complementary 
ways: directly by keeping fields of financial activity ruled by private contract,11 and 
indirectly by influencing the (national and international) financial rule-makers 
with a formidable lobbying capacity (regulatory capture). 12 
                                                        
7 Nicholas Dorn, ‘Financial market regulation: still a regime removed from politics?’, in Ismail 
Etürk/Daniela Gabor (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Banking Regulation and Reform 
(Routledge 2016) 290-294. 
8 Nicholas Dorn, Democracy and Diversity in Financial Market Regulation (Routledge 2015) 7-12. 
9 Lucia Quaglia, ‘European Union Financial Regulation, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union and 
the UK’, in Colin Hay/Daniel Bailey (Eds.), Diverging Capitalisms. Britain, the City of London and 
Europe (Palgrave MacMillan 2019) 99-123. 
10  Defending self-regulation to avoid administrative hurdles and promote innovation, see 
Christodoulos Stefanadis, ‘Self-Regulation, Innovation, and the Financial Industry’, 23 Journal of 
Regulatory Economics 5 (2003). 
11 For example, sovereign debt restructuring; see Matthias Goldmann, ‘Public and Private Authority 
in a Global Setting: The Example of Sovereign Debt Restructuring’, 25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 331 
(2018); IMF, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Staff Report (October 2014), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf. 
12 The fact that politicians often feel that it is their duty to support the national financial industry 





Indeed, the financial industry is interested in preventing an open and public 
debate on the regulation of financial markets that takes into account not only the 
need to keep the liquidity of markets, stop the contagion effects of failing banks, 
foster diversification of risks and promote the activities of the national financial 
champions, but also privileges the protection of consumers’ rights and taxpayers’ 
interests. The status quo benefits present financial market operators because gains 
are private while losses are to a great extent socialized in today’s world. The 
challenge for those purporting a narrative for a more democratic regulation of 
financial markets is to make it compatible with their efficient functioning so that 
they can continue providing their very important social function: the financing of 
productive economy and the facilitation of daily economic transactions of physical 
and legal persons. 
 
2.2. The role of the public authorities: Regulation v. Deregulation 
 
Scholars can be divided depending on whom is identified as the main culprit of the 
2008 financial crisis. Some authors blame the markets and identify deregulation, 
excessive risk-taking and opaqueness of certain financial products as the main 
causes of the crisis while others accuse weaknesses in regulation (policies 
encouraging housing ownership, capital regulations, leniency with risky derivative 
products, or even excessively generous bail-outs/safety nets) as the most relevant 
triggers of the financial markets’ collapse. Most authors, however, would point 
towards a multi-faceted responsibility including both market and regulatory 
failures.13 
 
It would be inaccurate to identify market insiders (financial firms) as generally 
favoring deregulation while attributing to market outsiders (those that only use 
financial markets as end consumers) a preference for stronger regulation. Hart has 
submitted that in times of crisis both insiders and outsiders similarly increase 
their support for more regulation; it is in times of growth when there is a greater 
                                                                                                                                                                  
as the main causes of ‘regulatory capture’. Besides, the regulators need data on the functioning of 
the markets that only insiders can provide. The studies and analysis that the big financial firms can 
produce give additional incentives to public authorities to look at financial reform from the 
perspective of those leading this industry (Anat R. Admati, ‘It Takes a Village to Maintain a 
Dangerous Financial System’, in Lisa Herzog (Ed), Just Financial Markets? (OUP 2017) 293-315; 
Christopher Arup, ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Learning from Regulatory and Governance Studies’, 
32(3) Law & Policy 363 (2010) at 364-367; Kenneth Haar et al., A Captive Commission: The Role of 
the Financial Industry in Shaping EU Legislation, October 2009, available at https://www.alter-
eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/a-captive-commission-5-11-09.pdf). 
13 Tons of paper have been written discussing the causes of 2008 financial crisis. For this doctrinal 
debate, see among others John B. Taylor, Government as a Cause of the 2008 Financial Crisis: A 
Reassessment after 10 Years, Hoover Institution Economics Working Paper 18116 (2018), available 
at https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/18116_taylor.pdf; Philip Turner, Did 
Central Banks Cause the Last Financial Crisis? Will They Cause the Next?, Discussion Paper nº 484, 
2017, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, available at 
https://www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publications/DP484.pdf; Özgür Orhangazi, Financial 
deregulation and the 2007-08 US financial crisis, FESSUD Working Paper Series No. 49 (2014), 
available at http://fessud.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Financial-deregulation-and-the-2007-
08-US-financial-crisis-Working-Paper-49.pdf; Eilís Ferran/ Niamh Moloney/ Jennifer Hill/ John C. 
Coffee, The Regulatory Aftermath of the Financial Crisis (CUP 2012); Emilios Avgouleas, Governance 




preference for the deregulation by insiders than by outsiders.14 When the economy 
is expanding, the perspective of increased gains makes insiders more easily forget 
the prudence that generated consensus in times of recession (fewer benefits in 
exchange for a more stable market). Outsiders do not receive such a strong 
incentive to change their views in times of economic upswing. 
 
It is the legislator’s task to strike a balance and decide on the appropriate quantity 
of regulation. The extraordinary complexity of today’s financial markets rules out 
civil society giving a detailed mandate to its democratic representatives on the 
level of regulation for each financial market or product. However, these economic 
activities should be regulated giving priority to financial stability (a common good 
that benefits everybody) above extraordinary benefits for the financial industry. 
Besides, the level of regulation should be compatible with the political preferences 
expressed by the population in democratic elections.15 Thus there is no objective 
optimal level of regulation, but each jurisdiction will have to define its 
particularities within the framework established by international coordination. 
 
Except for those that would like to go back to the times of ring-fenced national 
capital markets, the establishment of international standards is indispensable for 
an ordered governance of global capital markets, to provide a level playing field for 
international financial firms and to minimize the spill-over effects of financial 
crises. From a global perspective, the fact that the international normative 
framework is established by standard setting bodies that produce non-binding 
codes of conduct favors a loose regulatory framework based on the minimum 
common denominator (to reach compromises and foster compliance).16 In the case 
of the European Union, there was wide consensus after the 2008 crisis on the need 
to strengthen financial integration and to improve and reinforce capital market 
regulation. We will examine later whether these reforms have lived up to their 
expectations. 
 
When we refer to the degree of state intervention in financial markets we cannot 
forget the increasingly important role of central banks not only as regulators but 
also as providers of liquidity, market operators and lenders of last resort. After the 
2008 crisis the social consequences of central banks’ policies became undeniable 
and the old theories that sustained the political neutrality of monetary policy were 
phased out.17 Central banks not only use interest rates to influence the level of 
inflation and money supply but have recourse to new and unconventional 
instruments such as quantitative easing and other open market operations (in 
                                                        
14  Derek Hart, ‘Market Regulation Preferences: Investor Influence? Regulation Preference 
Paradigms of Financial Markets in the 21st century’, 8(1) International Journal of Business and 
Social Science 133 (2017) 137-139. 
15 Dorn (2016) supra n. 7 at 298-300. 
16 Renate Mayntz, ‘International Institutions of Financial Market Regulation: An Example of 
Network Governance?’, in Hollstein B., Matiaske W., Schnapp KU. (eds) Networked Governance 
(Springer 2017) at 82. 
17 Peter Dietsch, ‘Normative Dimensions of Central Banking: How the Guardians of Financial 
Markets Affect Justice’, in Lisa Herzog (Ed), Just Financial Markets? (OUP 2017) 231; John R. 
Freeman, ‘Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the Design of Monetary 




particular, the acquisition of state bonds), 18 that have a direct impact on the public 
authorities’ capacity to finance social policies and entail distributional effects.19  
The European Central Bank (ECB) has assumed a particularly active role in the 
context of the measures taken to counter the financial crises and banish the 
existential threats to the European monetary union.20 The recognition of its 
audacity to sail in troubled waters and to avoid the worst scenarios must run in 
parallel to the request of enhanced accountability in a way that is proportionate to 
the political relevance of its decisions.21 
 
2.3. Efficiency and fairness in the reform of financial market regulation 
 
Any reform of financial markets should have as its ultimate objective the better 
fulfillment of their social functions: providing the real economy with swift 
instruments to channel capital from its owners towards investors (efficient 
allocation of resources), diversifying the risks and facilitating payments. This 
should be done in the most effective way and with the minimum social and 
economic cost. The social cost can be measured as the degree of 
unfairness/inequality generated and the number of people made worse-off by a 
certain policy or law. The idea that any reform that increases the ethical 
requirements of financial firms will necessarily prejudice their profits or their 
resilience should be disregarded as an unfounded prejudice that needs to be 
verified on a case-by-case basis.22 The increase in social peace or in the stability of 
financial markets may generate benefits that compensate the burdens derived 
from such reform. 
 
                                                        
18 In its Gauweiler judgment, the ECJ established that the ECB’s program of Outright Monetary 
Transactions (that involves the purchase of government bonds in secondary markets) is part of the 
monetary policy and not ‘economic policy measures’ despite the potential ‘indirect’ consequences 
on the economic policy of specific member states. It has later confirmed that the Public Sector 
Purchasing Program put in place by Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the ECB is also a legitimate and 
proportionate instrument of monetary policy. See the judgments of the CJEU of 11 December 2018, 
Weiss and others, Case C-493/17, 55-61 and of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler, Case C-62/14, 55-59 
(Andrej Lang, 'Ultra vires review of the ECB’s policy of quantitative easing: An analysis of the 
German Constitutional Court’s preliminary reference order in the PSPP case', 55(3) Common 
Market Law Review, 923–951 (2018); Alicia Hinarejos, ‘Gauweiler and the Outright Monetary 
Transactions Programme: The Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Changing Nature of 
Economic and Monetary Union’, 11 European Constitutional Law Review 563-576 (2015)). 
19 Richard Dobbs et al., QE and ultra-low interest rates: Distributional effects and risks (McKinsey 
Global Institute 2013), available at https://www.mckinsey.com. 
20 Sebastian Watzka, ‘Contagion Risk During the Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis: Greece, 
Convertibility Risk, and the ECB as Lender of Last Resort’, in Frank Heinemann/ Ulrich Klüh/ 
Sebastian Watzka (Eds,), Monetary Policy, Financial Crises, and the Macroeconomy (Springer 2017) 
79-104; Tomas Hirst, ‘What the ECB is doing to Greek banks is outrageous’, Business Insider (2 
February 2015) available at https://www.businessinsider.com/ecb-threats-greece-over-
emergency-funding-2015-2?IR=T. 
21 Grégory Claeys/ Mark Hallerberg/ Olga Tschekassin, European Central Bank accountability: How 
the monetary dialogue could be improved, Bruegel Policy Contribution, No. 2014/04 available at 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/106320/1/779994744.pdf. 
22 E.g. Bouslah et al. submit that the increase in the standards of social performance significantly 
reduces volatility for companies during financial crises (Kais Bouslah/ Lawrence Kryzanowski/ 
Bouchra M’Zali, ‘Social Performance and Firm Risk: Impact of the Financial Crisis’, 149(3) Journal of 




In this context, not every new product that increases the speed at which 
transactions are finalized (or the number of transactions, or their automation) in 
the capital markets will necessarily improve their performance.23 As happens with 
energy production, even if coal may be a cheaper way to generate electricity in 
some circumstances, it is widely acknowledged that its use must be reduced for the 
social cost (in terms of pollution) that it involves.24 Thus, the reduction of the 
social cost should be taken as one of the elements that can improve the functioning 
of financial markets, as is the case with the reduction of certain risks that might 
generate liquidity at first sight but pose an excessive threat to financial stability.25 
 
In theory, the price of each financial asset reflects its potentiality to produce 
income in the future according to the best available information. The market 
should reward those operators that adapt most quickly to new information or 
opportunities with the highest profit. But history teaches us that the price of each 
product in the capital market does not always accurately show its real value. This 
may be explained by different reasons: poor or asymmetric information, irrational 
behavior, deficient regulation, market externalities, political interference, etc.26 
When the state legislates to correct these imperfections it makes the market more 
efficient is spite of the administrative burdens imposed on its participants. The 
same happens when capital requirements are established for banks or certain 
commercial practices are restricted for their negative externalities.27 
 
It is no longer possible to encapsulate capital markets as an isolated reality in 
which the Pareto efficiency principle28  is the only parameter of normative 
reform.29 Besides, the Pareto equilibrium cannot be calculated just in terms of per 
capita income or short term satisfaction of consumer preferences.30 The objectives 
                                                        
23 Songzi Du/ Haoxiang Zhu, ‘What is the Optimal Trading Frequency in Financial Markets?’, 84(4) 
The Review of Economic Studies 1606-1651 (2017); Tim Harford, ‘High-frequency trading and the 
$440m mistake’, (11 August 2012) available at https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19214294. 
24 David Anthoff/ Johannes Emmerling, ‘Inequality and the Social Cost of Carbon’, 6(2) Journal of the 
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 29 (2019). 
25 Michael R. King/ Philipp Maier, ‘Hedge funds and financial stability: Regulating prime brokers 
will mitigate systemic risks’ 5(3) Journal of Financial Stability 283-297 (2009). 
26 A line of thinking compares the behavior of capital markets to a casino (Susan Strange, Casino 
Capitalism (Manchester University Press 2015); Hans-Werner Sinn, Casino Capitalism. How the 
Financial Crisis Came About and What Needs to be Done Now (OUP 2012)). Other authors present 
these inefficiencies as market imperfections that do not question their general capacity to provide 
an efficient allocation of resources in spite of the costly distortions that they generate (Tarek A. 
Hassan/ Thomas M. Mertens, ‘The Social Cost of Near-Rational Investment’ 107(4) American 
Economic Review 1059-1103 (2017)). 
27 Adam C. Kolasinski/ Adam Reed/ Jacob R. Thornock, ‘Can Short Restrictions Actually Increase 
Informed Short Selling?’ 42(1) Financial Management 155-181 (2013). 
28 The Pareto efficiency principle aims at a situation of perfect competition in which resources are 
allocated in the best way possible because no additional trade can make anyone better off without 
making other individual(s) worse off. From a legal point of view, when the legislative framework 
favors this ideal situation, we speak of the Pareto equilibrium. 
29 For a defense of the advantages of a social methodology for the analysis of financial markets’ 
performance and regulation with the instruments of behavioral economics see Julia Black, Seeing, 
Knowing, and Regulating Financial Markets: Moving the Cognitive Framework from the Economic to 
the Social, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 24/2013, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346098. 
30 On the relationship between Pareto efficient behavior and ethic management of firms, see Jeffery 




of the norm should also include the achievement of the minimum elements of 
justice and equality that society requests. It is this complex mix of objectives that 
should provide the criteria to evaluate the maximization of social welfare to be 
attained by the norm.31 
 
Financial markets undoubtedly have a strong impact on the distribution of wealth 
and opportunities, on the bargaining power of labor vis-à-vis capital32 and 
therefore on the social model. Their reform should involve a previous evaluation of 
their social cost as part of the analysis on the most efficient way in which they can 
fulfill their general functions.33 
 
I agree with Claassen’s submission in the sense that any financial reform must take 
into account the interests of three groups of stakeholders: market participants 
(banks and other financial firms), consumers (persons that only participate in the 
financial market as end consumers) and third parties affected (those that do not 
participate in the financial market as producers or consumers but whose interests 
are touched by its externalities, namely taxpayers or workers of the productive 
industries).34 During the period of liberalization of capital markets since the mid 
eighties to 2007, financial regulation prioritized the provision of liquidity and the 
globalization of money markets, and as corollary the growth of financial markets 
and of employment and remuneration in that profession.35 In other words, 
financial regulation favored the interests of market participants above those of 
consumers and third parties. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
618 (2018). Criticizing the preference for the utilitarian approach in the configuration of markets, 
see Shengwu Li, ‘Ethics and Market Design’, 33(4) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 705-720 
(2017). 
31 We are using here the epistemological instruments of the normative economy that defends the 
critical analysis of law from the perspective of its efficacy to achieve its objectives that must be 
evaluated as an instrument of social welfare maximization (Luis M. Hinojosa-Martínez, "A favor del 
análisis económico del Derecho internacional y de la renovación metodológica", en Anna M. Badia 
(Coord.), El Derecho internacional ante los retos de nuestro tiempo. Homenaje a la Profesora Victoria 
Abellán Honrubia (Marcial Pons 2009) 415-417; Bingyuan Hsiung, ‘Economic Analysis of Law: an 
Inquary in its Underlying Logic’, 2(1) Erasmus Law and Economics Review 1 (2006) at 15-16). 
32 For an analysis of the influence in the labor market of the financialization of the economy see 
Thibault Darcillon, ‘Labor-Market Volatility and Financial Development in the Advanced OECD 
Countries: Does Labor-Market Regulation Matter?’, 58 Comparative Economic Studies 254-278 
(2016); John Grahl, ‘Financial Change and European Employment Relations’, en John Grahl (Ed.), 
Global Finance and Social Europe (Edward Elgar 2009) 123. 
33 While some authors establish a clear dichotomy between the markets (that should be ruled by 
efficiency) and the state (that provides justice and corrects social inequalities through 
redistributive policies), in this paper we submit that the social cost of injustice and unfairness is a 
very relevant factor to evaluate market efficiency (Irene van Staveren, ‘The ethics of efficiency’, 
SCEME Working Papers: Advances in Economic Methodology 018/2007 available at 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/sti/wpaper/018-2007.html; Samuel Bowles/Herbert Gintis, ‘Efficient 
Redistribution: New Rules for Markets, States and Communities’, 24 Politics and Society 307 
(1996)).  
34 Rutger Claassen, ‘A capability Framework for Financial Market Regulation’ in Lisa Herzog (Ed), 
Just Financial Markets? (OUP 2017) 56-77. 
35 Lisa Herzog, ‘Can Incomes in Financial Markets be Deserved? A Justice-Based Critique’, in Lisa 
Herzog (Ed), Just Financial Markets? (OUP 2017) 103-121; Lutz G. Arnold/ Sebastian Zelzner, The 
Allocation of Talent to Financial Trading versus Entrepreneurship: Welfare Effects of Trading in 






The severity and depth of the 2008 financial crisis has brought to light this 
imbalance. In the first place, consumers clearly needed more protection to shelter 
them from the abuses of an industry that offered extremely complex products that 
were incomprehensible for the average citizen and sometimes misleading for the 
average investor.36 But in the second place, the most relevant lesson of this crisis 
has been that negative externalities for third parties had not been adequately 
taken into account in economic theory and many of them cannot be tolerated.37 
The losses generated for society were clearly underestimated in previous studies 
on the efficiency and functioning of financial markets38 and their profound reform 
became a priority political demand. Unfortunately, the political thrust that 
propelled such reform from 2008-2009 has weakened today and many of the 
hopes it raised have been frustrated to a great extent. 
 
III. The governance of European Financial Markets 
 
This section reviews how the EU’s financial normative output is produced and the 
way in which it reflects the general trends described in the previous section. We 
want to determine if the EU’s regulatory competences and procedures enable it to 
build a social market economy in which financial markets can be regulated with 
appropriate mechanisms of accountability and democratic control.  
 
3.1. The EU’s normative framework 
 
A doctrinal sector has often accused the European integration process of fostering 
economic liberalization as an instrument to achieve market integration or even an 
enhanced political union. According to this discourse, the consolidation of pan-
European markets would have been privileged over the protection of the European 
social model, and negative normative techniques (the prohibition of restrictions) 
would have favored de facto market deregulation.39 This alleged trend would also 
apply to the financial markets in a process that began in the eighties with the 
liberalization of capital movements (first between member states and afterwards 
also with third countries), was complemented with the elimination of the obstacles 
to the transnational provision of financial services and reinforced with the 
                                                        
36 Manuel B. Aalbers/ Jannes Van Loon/ Rodrigo Fernandez, ‘The Financialization of A Social 
Housing Provider’ 41(4) International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 572-587 (2017); Neil 
Fligstein/ Alexander F. Roehrkasse, ‘The Causes of Fraud in the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009: 
Evidence from the Mortgage-Backed Securities Industry’ 81(4) American Sociological Review 617-
643 (2016). 
37 Russ Roberts, Gambling with Other People’s Money. How Perverse Incentives Caused the Financial 
Crisis (Hoover Institution Press 2019); Ioannis N. Kallianiotis, ‘Privatization in Greece and Its 
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38 Ben Bernanke, The Real Effects of Disrupted Credit Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (13-14 September 2018), available at 
http://tankona.free.fr/bernanke918.pdf. 
39 For this debate, see Jason Beckfield, Unequal Europe: Regional Integration and the Rise of 
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consolidation of the European economic and monetary union. The initiatives to 
create a Capital Markets Union40 and the still incomplete Banking Union41 are two 
additional steps in the construction of a fully integrated financial market in the EU. 
 
However, the EU’s economic constitutional framework is explicitly compatible 
with social markets. From the formal proclamation of the fundamental principles 
(Article 3 EU Treaty says that the EU shall establish a ‘social market economy’)42 to 
the positive techniques of economic integration through harmonization (e.g. 
Articles 49, 56, 63, 114 and 352 TFEU in the context of finance), the legislative 
tools for the regulation of European markets are prepared to be compatible with 
different political ideologies and a social conception of the market.43 The case law 
of the CJEU has been generally respectful of member states’ social protection 
rules44 in spite of some controversial decisions on labor standards45 and its 
general support for the extraordinary measures taken to avoid the destruction of 
the Eurozone during the crisis (even if they had harmful consequences for 
individuals).46 In any case, the responsibility for the legislation enacted for the 
regulation of European financial markets should be attributed to the majorities 
                                                        
40 Communication from the Commission ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’, Doc. 
COM(2015) 468 final, 30 September 2015, and the mid-term review in Doc. COM(2017) 292 final, 8 
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European Union’s Internal Market’, 25(3) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
310-331 (2018); Ainhoa Lasa López, `Constitución económica europea y modelo social: límites e 
ineficiencias de la integración negative mejorada en la lucha contra la exclusion social’ 53 
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43 Dragana Damjanovic, ‘The EU Market Rules as Social Market Rules: Why the EU can be a Social 
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if it respects the principle of proportionality. In the context of the provision of financial services, see 
for example the judgments of the CJEU of 14 February 2019, Milivojevic, C-630/17, 71-72, and of 
10 May 1995, Alpine Investments, C-384/93, 44. In relation to the protection of the member states’ 
social system, see among others the judgments of 21 June 2012, Susisalo et al., C-84/11, 31-44 
(health system), and of 21 September 1999, Albany, C-67/96, 111 (pension funds). However, 
criticizing the lack of ‘sensitivity’ of the Court for using a ‘harsh’ proportionality test in this context 
see Sionaidh Douglas-Scott/ Nicholas Hatzis, ‘EU Law and Social Rights’, in Sionaidh Douglas-Scott/ 
Nicholas Hatzis (Eds.), Research Handbook on EU Law and Human Rights (Edward Elgar 2017) 492-
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45 E.g., Judgments of the CJEU of 3 April 2008, Rüffert, C-346/06, of 11 December 2007, Vicking, C-
438/05, and of 18 December 2007, Laval, C-341/05 (Mark R. Freedland, Jeremias Prassl (Eds.), 
Viking, Laval and Beyond (Hart 2016)). 
46 E.g., judgments of the CJEU of 13 June 2017, Florescu, C-258/14, and of of 20 September 2016, 
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existing in the European legislative bodies at that time47 rather than to an indelible 
original sin of the integration process. The articulation of more or less generous 
social policies continues to be a competence essentially in the hands of the 
member states, perhaps with the exception of the very unusual period of the 
recent financial crisis for those member states subject to rescue packages whose 
budgetary sovereignty has been significantly eroded.48 
 
3.2. Lamfalussy, de Larosière and Agencification 
 
The technical complexity of the financial markets and their great capacity of 
innovation and transformation made it difficult to use the European ordinary 
legislative procedure to regulate and harmonize them adequately in order to foster 
the articulation of a pan-European capital market. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century financial companies still suffered significant hurdles in their 
transnational activities and the EU decided to improve its regulatory capacity in 
this field through what was known as the Lamfalussy process. The European 
Commission launched a Financial Services Action Plan in 1999 with the objective 
of ‘establishing a single market in wholesale financial services, making retail 
markets open and secure and strengthening the rules on prudential supervision’. 49 
In the course of that process, the European Council adopted the ‘Final Report of the 
Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets’ (headed by 
Alexandre Lamfalussy) on 23 March 2001. 50 This document established the 
framework for the subsequent reform in the regulation of European financial 
markets. It distinguished four levels of European action:  
Level 1. The ordinary legislative procedure (Regulations and Directives approved 
by the European Parliament and the Council at the proposal of the Commission) in 
which consultation with market operators would be enhanced.  
Level 2. To avoid the slow process of level 1, the Commission would adopt and 
update the rules implementing the legislation passed at level 1 following a revised 
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comitology procedure.51 The lower participation of the Council and the European 
Parliament at this level favors a quicker and more flexible decision-making. 
Level 3. Committees of national supervisors (composed of the national supervisory 
authorities and different from the level 2 committees where member states’ 
governments were directly represented) were created to issue recommendations 
and to harmonize the interpretation of the binding rules in their task of 
supervision. Although level 3 guidelines should be considered soft-law, the peer 
review system that they established and their precision considerably increased the 
harmonization of supervisory standards in the EU and the level of complexity of 
the European normative output.52  
Level 4. The Commission should reinforce the vigilance of the correct application 
of European financial norms (levels 1 and 2) by the member states. 
 
The Lamfalussy process was implemented in the securities field in the first place 
and formally extended in 2004 to banking, insurance, occupational pensions and 
asset management although with some variations depending on the financial 
sector. In general terms, this reform improved the quality and transparency of EU’s 
financial legislation and fostered the integration of European capital markets.53 
 
After the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, the Commission asked Jacques de 
Larosière to create a group of experts (High-Level Group on Supervision) that 
could report on the causes of the crisis, its policy and regulatory repair, the way to 
improve EU’s supervisory performance and the best options for global repair. 
Building on the diagnosis and recommendations of this Report,54 two main 
institutional reforms were adopted: the creation of a European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) (to monitor potential risks for financial stability and establish an 
early warning system)55 and the upgrading and transformation of the previous 
supervisory bodies of level 3 into a European System of Financial Supervisors 
(ESFS) that included a European Banking Authority (EBA), a European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and a European Securities 
Authority (ESA).56 In the new scenario created by the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty (2009) the main reforms in the normative structure affected levels 2 and 3: 
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53 Zdenek Kudrna, The EU Financial Market Policy: Evolution, Innovation and Research Outlook, OAW 
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Level 2. When level 1 legislation provides for the adoption of level 2 acts it must 
distinguish between delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU) if the implementing norm is 
to supplement or amend non-essential elements of the enabling legislative act, and 
implementing acts (Article 291 TFEU) where uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed. 
Level 3. The new European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) could participate in the 
adoption of binding technical standards in two different ways (to be determined in 
the enabling legislative act): acts adopted by the Commission through a delegated 
act in the context of Article 290 TFEU (regulatory technical standards), or 
implementing acts as envisaged in Article 291(2) TFEU (implementing technical 
standards).57 Before their adoption, the technical standards are systematically 
subject to public consultation. Thus, the ESA were thereby involved in the 
elaboration of level 2 measures (binding technical standards). Nevertheless, in the 
case of the regulatory technical standards, the European Parliament or the Council 
may revoke the normative delegation at any time (Article 12 of the ESA 
Regulations)58 and regain full control of the normative process. These are the two 
institutions to which ESA are accountable. The CJEU has established that their 
control of the normative process is sufficient to safeguard basic democratic 
legitimacy concerns and coherence with the distribution of powers established in 
the constituent Treaties.59 While some authors would praise the independence of 
these agencies as a guarantee to preserve the technical quality of their normative 
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production, others would value this independence negatively as buttressing the 
traditional democratic deficit in the regulation of financial markets.60 
 
The de Larosière reform has thus resulted in a reinforcement of the normative 
capacity of the European agencies61 (in particular in the field of supervision), but 
also in the assumption of new executive competences62 by these bodies with the 
objective of harmonizing in practice and improving the public authorities input in 
the European financial markets.63 This transfer of competences to the European 
level of governance increases the influence of the European bodies in the financial 
conditioning of the social model. Two main instruments try to channel the 
democratic control of this normative production: 
 
a) A system of broad consultations with interested stakeholders. Articles 10 and 15 
of ESA Regulations oblige these agencies (or the Commission, as the case may be) 
to conduct open public consultations before approving their technical standards.64 
Even the guidelines and recommendations of these authorities are generally 
subject to open public consultations (Article 16 ESA Regulations). Each ESA hosts a 
Stakeholder Group that provides technical advice and comments on its different 
normative or policy initiatives.65 However, in spite of this transparency effort, the 
consultation procedure is dominated by the big financial corporations that possess 
the human resources, the information, the interest and the experience to make the 
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also Article 15 TFEU. 
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most substantial contributions.66 The revolving doors between the financial 
industry and the administrations from which ESA’s members originate also favor 
the climate of understanding between the rule-makers and financial 
corporations.67 In this context, the articulation of stringent rules preventing 
conflicts of interest inside ESA 68  is indispensable and yet insufficient to 
compensate for the big financial firms’ de facto power of guidance. 
 
b) The control of political institutions. First, ESA have significantly eroded the 
Commission’s power of initiative, but they cannot disregard the Commission’s 
views because they need its approval for the adoption of their regulatory 
proposals.69 Second, the delegation to adopt regulatory technical standards may be 
revoked at any time by the Council or the European Parliament (Article 12 ESA 
Regulations).70 Third, the delegation to adopt regulatory technical standards is 
reevaluated every four years and the Parliament or the Council may decide to 
revoke it if they are not happy with the general outcome (Article 11 ESA 
Regulations). These two institutions also adopt ESA’s budget (Article 63 ESA 
Regulations). From my perspective it is not possible to separate the technical 
judgments of ESA from the political choices that they imply. 71  The swift 
governance of financial markets improves with this highly qualified decision-
making, but the political control ex-post facto of the European Parliament and the 
Council, together with their indirect instruments of control (such as the 
assignment of budgetary priorities, or the establishment of political indications), 
must be placed as an essential element of this procedure if we want citizens to 
have some influence in the distributional effects of financial market regulation.  
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Finally, as has already been said, the internationalization of the decision–making 
process for the regulation of capital markets provides a further element of 
alienation of the democratic control of European financial norms. This regulatory 
externalization comes about in two ways: 
 
1) The international normative framework that conditions the European 
regulatory output. The elitist and technocratic origin of these international rules 
has already been commented on in this chapter.72 Therefore, when the European 
institutions implement these standards they reproduce the social model embedded 
in these international rules. 
 
2) The creation of international bodies outside the EU institutional structure to 
provide stability to European financial markets (European Stability Mechanism, 
Single Resolution Fund). The economic importance of these entities runs parallel 
to their distancing from the mechanisms of legitimization and accountability 
developed in the EU system of multilevel governance. 73 While the urgencies of the 
crisis might justify the use of flexible instruments that could be put in place 
quickly, the long-term management of these important bodies requires the 
articulation of the appropriate mechanisms of democratic control. 
 
3.3. The role of the European Central Bank 
 
This European regulatory framework has to be completed with a reference to the 
legislative and executive competences of the European Central Bank (ECB) that 
today not only cover its monetary policy but it also extend to the supervision of 
credit institutions under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).74 Its powerful 
normative capacity enables the ECB to make Regulations, Decisions, 
Recommendations and Opinions (Article 132 TFUE). It can also adopt Guidelines 
and Instructions to ensure the proper functioning of the European System of 
Central Banks (Articles 12 and 14 ECB Statute). The ECB can also  impose  fines  or  
periodic  penalty  payments  on  private undertakings  for  failure  to  comply  with  
the obligations that it imposes (Article 34(1) ECB Statute).75 
 
As a European institution, the conceptual and legal framing of ECB’s normative and 
executive powers is different from that of ESA. The debate on the autonomy of 
monetary policy and the most adequate mechanisms for its democratic control and 
the accountability of the Central Bank goes beyond the boundaries of the EU and 
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constitutes a classic debate in economic and political literature.76 For the purposes 
of this chapter, it may suffice to note that the constituent Treaties accord great 
importance to ECB’s independence in the design of its monetary policy,77 which is 
subject to a deliberative accountability 78  but well protected from direct 
interference from the political institutions. The ECB’s reporting obligations allow it 
to know what it has done and why ex post facto.79 In any case, as the other 
European institutions, the ECB is subject to the control of legality exercised by the 
CJEU.80 
 
Insofar as the ECB’s decisions are made in the inter-governmental institutions 
(such as the European Stability Mechanism) created during the financial crisis, the 
same accountability rules apply.81 While the legal debate on the compatibility of 
ECB’s activities in these international bodies with its conferred powers has now 
been clarified by the CJEU,82 the opportuneness to increase ECB’s accountability 
for the political decisions taken in the implementation of these new tasks is 
pressing.83 
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15 ECB Statute). However, the ECB is not obliged to disclose all the documents that it has used or 
requested in its decision-making in order to safeguard its independence and the confidentiality of 
its internal deliberations (judgment of the General Court of 12 March 2019, De Masi, T-798/17, 66-
67). See also Pieter van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Confidentiality behind Transparent Doors: The European 
Central Bank and the EU Law Principle of Openness’, 25(1) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 52-76 (2018). 
80 Jacopo Alberti, ‘Challenging the Evolution of EMU: The Justiciability of Soft Law Measures 
Enacted by the ECB against the Financial Crisis before the European Courts’, 37(1) Yearbook of 
European Law 626-649 (2018). 
81 Criticizing the inadequacy of present accountability rules in view of the important political role 
played by the ECB during the recent financial crisis, see Chris Land, ‘The Eurozone Crisis and the 
European Central Bank's Lost Independence’, 25 Minnesota Journal of International Law 483-518 
(2016). 
82 Judgment of the CJEU of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, 158-165. See Luis M. Hinojosa 
Martínez, ‘La compatibilidad del Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad con el Derecho europeo: 
jurisprudencia para tiempos de crisis’, in Diego J. Liñán (Ed.), Las Crisis Políticas y Económicas: 
Nuevos Escenarios Internacionales (Tecnos 2014) 212-238. 
83 Christophe Blot/Paul Hubert/ Fabien Labondance, ‘Reforming the European Central Bank’, in 
Jérôme Creel/ Éloi Laurent/ Jacques Le Cacheux (Eds), Report on the State of the European Union, 





In democratic countries, the management of prudential supervision is usually 
more linked to the executive power and subject to more parliamentary control 
mechanisms than the monetary policy. Thus the accountability of ECB’s organs in 
the field of prudential supervision is enhanced but their decision-making process 
is still kept insulated from external political intrusion.84 At the end of the day, it is 
the Governing Council of the ECB (the supreme and independent monetary 
authority) that takes the definitive decisions also in the ambit of supervision. 
Nevertheless, as a question of principle, the ECB (more directly, its Supervisory 
Board) is accountable to the European Parliament and the Council in this domain.85 
Besides, the possibility that national Parliaments invite the Chair or a member of 
the Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of views in relation to the 
supervision of credit institutions in that member state is undoubtedly a striking 
novelty in the EU’s conception of accountability.86 
 
IV. Case Studies of Financial Reform: Their Incidence on Distributional 
Policies 
 
The purpose of this section is to analyze some examples of recent regulatory 
reform in Europe as a response to the financial crisis to check out if they have 
eroded the European social model and betrayed the promises that accompanied 
their presentation or, on the contrary, they have improved the regulation of 
financial markets making them more stable while enhancing the protection of 
taxpayers and consumers and generating positive distributional effects. As it 
would be impossible to analyze in detail all the huge legislative effort that the EU 
has recently developed in the financial field, we have chosen three of the most 
emblematic and ‘revolutionary’ European reforms to perform this evaluation. 
 
                                                        
84 The reporting obligations of the ECB in the field of supervision are similar to those on monetary 
matters. Additionally, the ECB is obliged to answer orally or in writing to questions put to it by the 
European Parliament or by the euro Group. The Chair of the Supervisory Board can be asked to 
take part in confidential oral discussions behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the 
competent committee of the European Parliament. This Institution also has to approve the 
nomination of the Chair and Vice-Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board. After the appointment, the 
Council by qualified majority may remove them from office, but this can only be done following a 
proposal of the ECB and with the approval of the European Parliament (Articles 20, 26(4) of 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions, OJ L 287, 29 October 2013, p. 63–89 [SSM Regulation]). An Interinstitutional 
Agreement has been concluded between the ECB and the European Parliament organising their 
relationship (Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the ECB on the 
practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of 
the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, OJ L 
320, 30 November 2013, p. 1). 
85  Article 20(1) SSM Regulation. See Fabian Amtenbrink/ Menelaos Markakis, ‘Towards a 
Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue in the Euro Area? A Study of the Interaction Between 
the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism’, (1) 
European Law Review 3-23 (2019). 
86 Article 21 SSM Regulation. Warning against the clash of legitimacies that may appear when the 
European supervisory authority explains decisions taken in the general ‘interest of the Union as a 
whole’ (Article 19(1) SSM Regulation) confronting potential conflicting arguments by national MPs 




4.1. The Recovery and Resolution of Banks 
 
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)87 entered into force in 2014 
promising that credit institutions would not continue privatizing earnings in 
prosperous times while they socialized losses when crises arrive. This Directive 
introduced several measures to achieve this objective: 
 
a) A system of early intervention that could involve, among other things, taking 
over the management of these institutions and appointing a temporary 
administrator88 if this could prevent a more costly operation of recovery or 
resolution (when the situation has worsened and the credit institution is no longer 
viable).89 
 
b) Before injecting any public money in a troubled bank, a bail-in procedure is 
triggered so that its shareholders and creditors are the first to lose their money to 
absorb the losses.90 Non-guaranteed deposits over 100.000 € could also be called 
in to cover the restructuring costs if it is necessary in exceptional circumstances. 
No public funding can be provided for the resolution until the shareholders and the 
holders of other instruments of ownership contribute to loss absorption with no 
less than 8% of the undertaking’s total liabilities.91 In any case, member states 
‘may exclude or partially exclude certain liabilities from the’ bail-in, inter alia to 
avoid contagion to other institutions or a destruction in value that ‘would be 
higher than if those liabilities were excluded from bail-in’ if the Commission does 
not object.92 Covered deposits are always fully protected. 
 
c) National resolution funds have been created on the basis of the contributions of 
credit institutions and investment undertakings. 93  They could provide the 
additional funds needed to restructure any of these firms with the strict limits 
established in BRRD (e.g. the financing cannot exceed 5 % of the bank’s total 
liabilities) and always respecting EU state aids rules. Nevertheless, member states 
can provide additional funding for these operations ‘in the very extraordinary 
situation of a systemic crisis’ through the use of government funds after the above-
mentioned 8% bail-in has been applied and if the Commission considers the 
operation compatible with EU state aids regulation.94 
                                                        
87 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment 
firms (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190–348). 
88 E.g. ECB, ECB appoints temporary administrators for Banca Carige, Press release, 2 January 2019, 
available at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/ssm.pr190102.en.html. 
On 8 January 2019, Italy’s government provided state guarantees of a nominal value of 3 billion 
euros in order to facilitate a capital increase (Decreto-Legge, Misure urgenti a sostegno della Banca 
Carige S.p.a. - Cassa di risparmio di Genova e Imperia (19G00002) (GU Serie Generale n.6 del 8 
January 2019)). 
89 Articles 27-30 BRRD. 
90 Article 34 BRRD. 
91 Article 37 BRRD. 
92 Article 44(3) and (12) BRRD. Nicola Ruccia, ‘The Role of the Private Sector In Resolution for 
Banks’, 57 Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 615-640 (2017) 627-629. 
93 Article 100 BRRD. 





Additionally, a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 95 was established for the 
member states participating in the Banking Union, together with the creation of a 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF).96 The SRM sets the procedure to be followed for the 
resolution of banks either subject to the SSM or whose resolution scheme requires 
the use of the SRF. The SRM respects the BRRD and has involved the creation of a 
Single Resolution Board (SRB). When a bank is identified as failing or likely to fail, 
the SRB must decide if a private sector solution is possible and, in the negative, 
whether it is in the public interest to initiate a resolution procedure. When it 
decides that it is not in the public interest to do so, the Bank will be wound up in 
accordance with the applicable national law. However, if the SRB decides that it is 
in the public interest to resolve the bank, it adopts a resolution scheme that is 
transmitted to the Commission. As a European agency the SRB cannot make 
discretional policy choices and therefore its resolution schemes need to be 
endorsed by the Commission.97 In some cases the Commission is obliged to ask the 
Council to approve its amendments to the SRB’s proposal.98 The whole procedure 
finishes in a maximum of 24 hours. 
 
The establishment of objective parameters to trigger the intervention of credit 
institutions intends to incentivize their safe management (Articles 9 and 27 
BRRD). The recovery and resolution plans pre-established for each institution also 
reduce the management’s scope for action. The bail-in preference for failing 
institutions diminishes the moral hazard and increases the risk for shareholders 
and creditors promoting them to exercise a closer vigilance over the management 
actions (they will object to risky operations if the bank approaches the trigger 
parameters). Has this legislation definitively protected public finances against the 
burden of saving failing banks and investment firms thereby deviating the use of 
taxpayer’s money from other social objectives? 
 
There are two essential objectives embedded in the BRRD: the continuance of the 
critical functions of banks facing difficulties and the stability of the financial 
                                                        
95 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and 
certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single 
Resolution Fund (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1–90) (SRM Regulation). 
96 The doubts about the soundness of Article 114 TFEU as a solid legal basis for the establishment of 
the SRF led to a political consensus whereby an international agreement among the member states 
would be signed to regulate certain aspects of the contributions and the use of the Fund (Council of 
the EU, Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of Contributions to the Single Resolution fund, 
Doc. 8457/14, 14 May 2014). See Federico Fabbrini, ‘On Banks, Courts and International Law: The 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund in Context’, 21 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 444-463 (2014). 
97 If the Commission objects to the discretionary aspects of the resolution scheme, the SRB has to 
modify it accordingly in 8 hours and the scheme will be approved (Article 18(7) SRM Regulation). 
98 If the Commission objects to the scheme because it does not consider it ‘in the public interest’ 
and the Council agrees with the Commission, the financial entity shall be wound up in accordance 
with the applicable national law. If the Commission objects to the scheme because it disagrees with 
the amount of the SRF to be used and the Council agrees with the Commission, the SRB has to 
modify the scheme accordingly in 8 hours and the scheme will be approved. However, if the Council 
refuses the Commission’s objections in either of these two cases, the resolution scheme enters into 




system. When problems arise, the ideal way out is of course to seek a market 
solution (to find a sound financial entity to buy the troubled undertaking),99 but 
this is usually difficult and will most often not possible, particularly in periods of 
general financial turmoil. When that is not feasible the narrative of the Directive 
clearly prioritizes the bail-in100 of failing credit institutions and it establishes 
various strict conditions before any public money can be used to recapitalize or 
restructure these undertakings. However, the BRRD leaves open certain bail-out 
options for anxious member states that find it less harmful to rescue a bank with 
public money than to wind it up assuming the blast wave of consequences. When a 
credit institution is still solvent but needs support because of the existence of 
‘serious disturbances’ in the economy of a member state, 101 the latter can provide 
certain state guarantees (to facilitate the raising of capital) or even an injection of 
own funds or purchase of capital (Article 32(4) BRRD) subject to the approval of 
the Commission under the Union state aid framework102 as has happened with 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena.103 
 
In the context of a resolution, Article 37(10) BRRD establishes that member states 
may provide public stabilization funds for equity support or assume the temporary 
public ownership of a credit entity in situations of ‘systemic crisis’, although they 
need the approval of the Commission under the Union state aid framework. To 
make this compatible with the BRRD some additional conditions have to be met,104 
                                                        
99 The Resolution of Banco Popular and its subsequent acquisition by Banco Santander was the first 
case of application of this market solution under the new system and was presented by the 
European authorities as an example of the fulfillment of the SRM objectives: no use of public money 
and maintenance of the critical functions of the troubled bank. However, more than 100 legal 
actions have been lodged at the international, European and national level in what will be a long 
legal battle that may condition the future configuration of the resolution regime in the EU. 
Nevertheless, the General Court has taken a restrictive approach towards the recognition of 
compensation to individuals prejudiced by the resolution operations (Judgments of the General 
Court of 13 July 2018, Chrysostomides, T-680/13 and Bourdouvali, T-786/14). Banco Santander 
declared one year later that the acquisition of Banco Popular had finally involved 12.000 million 
euros losses for the former. 
100 Bart P.M. Joosen, ‘Bail-In Mechanisms in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’, in Saskia 
M.C. Nuijten/ Bart P.M. Joosen/ Patrick Clancy, The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (Eleven International Publishing 2017) 23-46. 
101 Article 32(4) BRRD establishes additional conditions to this precautionary public support: it 
must be temporary, it cannot be used to offset losses, it must be proportionate to the disturbances 
in the state economy, etc. Besides, the injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments 
must be done at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the financial institution 
(World Bank, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD, 
(World Bank 2017) 67-72, available at 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/609571482207234996/FinSAC-BRRD-Guidebook.pdf). 
102 Maria Rosaria Miserendino, ‘State Aid for the Banking Sector: What Has Changed after the New 
BRRD and SRM Regulation’, 2018 European State Aid Law Quarterly 204 (2018). 
103 European Commission, Commission authorises precautionary recapitalisation of Italian bank 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Press Release, 4 July 2017. 
104 As already said, the shareholders, the holders of other instruments of ownership or capital, and 
the other eligible liabilities must have contributed to loss absorption with no less than 8% of the 




but the fact is that they do not block the path towards the bail-out of banks under 
resolution.105  
 
An additional way to justify the disbursement of state public funds consists of the 
declaration that the bank’s resolution is not in the public interest (for example, 
because that entity lacks systemic importance) and then it is referred to a 
liquidation procedure under national law. In that case, public authorities may 
provide financial support if they obtain the Commission’s placet under the Union 
state aid rules.106 The decision that determines whether it is in the public 
(European) interest to resolve a bank or it has to be liquidated according to 
national law implicates assessing many complex elements and involves some 
margin of discretion. The greater closeness of the national authorities to those 
directly affected by the resolution will undoubtedly influence their willingness to 
be more generous with the public help offered to soften the operation. A further 
element of distortion stems from the lack of harmonization of national insolvency 
regimes.107  Thus the European procedure for insolvent banks needs to be fine-
tuned to avoid accusations of applying double standards.108 
 
The contagion between failing banks’ debt and sovereign debt has been alleviated 
and the SRM seems to have increased the resilience of the European financial 
                                                        
105 Francesco Seatzu, ‘The Current Italian Banking Crisis: An Ultimate Litmus Test for Measuring the 
Growing Mood of Euro-Skepticism in the “Belpaese”?’, 42 Revista General de Derecho Europeo 
(2017), available at https://www.iustel.com//v2/revistas/detalle_revista.asp?id_noticia=418726&. 
106 This has been the case of the liquidation of Banca Populare de Vicenza and Veneto Banca in Italy 
in 2017. This process raised accusations of discrimination in relation to the treatment given to 
Banco Popular in Spain. The Italian government pumped 4.785 million euros (with a potential 
involvement in state guarantees of up to 12.000 million euros) in an operation to sell to Intesa 
Sanpaolo the solvent activities of these two entities while locating the rest of their operations in a 
bad bank created to that effect. Senior debt holders did not lose their money. The Commission 
considered that European state aid rules had been respected (European Commission, Commission 
approves aid for market exit of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca under Italian insolvency 
law, involving sale of some parts to Intesa Sanpaolo, Press Realese, 25 June 2017). For a similar 
decision in the Cypriot context, see European Commission, Commission approves aid for financing 
the orderly market exit of Cyprus Cooperative Bank Ltd, involving sale of some parts to Hellenic Bank, 
Press Release, 19 June 2018. 
107 The liquidation of ABLV Bank is particularly illustrative. On February 2018 the ECB declared 
that ABLV Bank and its subsidiary in Luxembourg were failing or likely to fail, and the SRB decided 
not to adopt a resolution scheme because it is not necessary in the public interest and referred the 
liquidation to Latvian law. However, on 9 March 2018, a Luxembourg Commercial Court decided 
not to place the Luxembourg subsidiary in liquidation because it considered it solvent, and 
appointed administrators to sell it to new investors. See J. Deslandes/ M. Magnus, Further 
Harmonising EU Insolvency Law from a Banking Resolution Perspective?, European Parliament, Doc. 
PE 614.514, April 2018, 2-3, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614514/IPOL_BRI(2018)614514_E
N.pdf. 
108 Denouncing the application of double standards when comparing the cases of Banco Popular 
with Banca Populare de Vicenza and Veneto Banca, see Luigi Scipione, ‘La liquidacio n  ordenada  
de los bancos del ve neto:  hacia la quiebra de la nueva normativa europea?’, 19532 La Ley 1-26 
(2017), or the Cypriot cases Eleni Koumidou, ‘Bail-In Nightmares: The Cypriot Bail-In Paradigm in 
the Light of the Italian and Spanish Cases’, 15(2) European Company Law 43-50 (2018); Jorge 
Urbaneja Cill|n, ‘El régimen jurídico de la reestructuración y resolución de entidades de crédito. la 
compleja transposición al ordenamiento español de la normativa europea’, 42 Revista General de 




system.109 However, member states continue to use public money to rescue 
troubled financial institutions either because they think that it will be less costly 
for their budget or because they fear the political price of liquidation. While this 
reform limits the shameless spread of credit institutions’ losses among the 
population, the social subsidization to the banking industry continues through the 
use of taxpayers’ money in recovery and resolution schemes.110 If the public 
authorities are convinced that the injection of fresh money will reduce the cost of 
recovering/resolving banks they should justify it with credible data and explain it 
openly to the citizenship. The required funding should be made explicit in the 
configuration of the social contract and not pilfered in haste in emergency 
government meetings as if financial crises were always taking us by surprise.  
 
4.2. The Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) 
 
The FTT has its origin in a proposal from Nobel Prize James Tobin to disincentive 
purely speculative operations in the exchange markets. 111  He proposed to levy a 
small tax on each transaction that would not deter long and medium-term 
operations but would significantly raise the cost of short-term transactions. This 
idea has gone through numerous developments and variations and has become 
one of the flagships of the anti-globalization movement.112 The idea of reducing 
purely speculative transactions that generate top-heavy financial markets, foster 
instability and provide no benefit for financing the real economy has found many 
followers.113 Apart from promoting a more stable environment, such a tax would 
contribute to make the financial markets pay for the social cost that their activities 
generate. Those that oppose the tax argue that it may negatively affect market 
liquidity, promote even greater instability and that it is likely to cause a 
delocalization of financial operations towards capital markets free from this 
burden.114 
 
After the severe and enduring speculative attacks against the public debt of some 
member states in 2010-2011, the Commission made a first proposal in 2011 for 
                                                        
109 See in that sense the revealing data provided by Giovanni Covi/ Ulrich Eydam, ‘End of the 
sovereign-bank doom loop in the European Union? The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’, 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 1-26 (2018). 
110 Marco Bodellini, ‘To Bail-In, or to Bail-Out, that is the Question’, 19 European Business 
Organization Law Review 365-392 (2018). 
111 James Tobin, ‘A Proposal for International Monetary Reform’, 4 Eastern Economic Journal 153-
159 (1978). 
112 E.g. Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financières et pour l'Action Citoyenne 
(ATTAC) (https://www.attac.org/en/overview). 
113 Vladimir N. Zuev/  Elena Y. Ostrovskaya, ‘Socializing Global Economic Governance: Introducing a 
Financial Transaction Tax’, 26(4) European Review 686-703 (2018); Eduardo Dávila, Optimal 
Financial Transaction Taxes, No 114 (2014) Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics, 
available at https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed014:114; Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Using Tax 
Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading’, 3 Journal of Financial Services Research 101–115 
(1989). 
114 Jean-Edouard Colliard/ Peter Hoffmann, ‘Financial Transaction Taxes, Market Composition, and 
Liquidity’, 72(6) The Journal of Finance 2685-2716 (2017); Thornton Matheson, Taxing Financial 





the establishment of a FTT for the whole EU.115 However, the lack of agreement in 
the Council after lengthy discussions led 11 member states to request an enhanced 
cooperation for the harmonization of the tax only among those countries that 
trusted its benefits one year later. 116 As a fiscal measure, unanimity was required 
for its approval (Article 113 TFEU) and this would have been impossible to achieve 
for the entire Union. After the enhanced cooperation was authorized117 the 
Commission presented a refurbished proposal on February 2013 that is still under 
discussion.118 
 
The FTT proposed by the Commission would tax almost all financial instruments 
when traded by financial firms. However, among other exceptions, trade in 
primary markets and transactions relevant for citizens and non-financial 
businesses are excluded from the tax (to protect the financing of the productive 
economy).119 A general rate of 0.1% is envisaged for most financial products, but 
derivatives would bear just a 0.01% rate.120 Two main measures are proposed to 
avoid the duty’s circumvention: a) when any party to the transaction is established 
in the participating members states, the operation is taxed even if it takes place 
outside the FTT-area (residence principle); b) all the transactions of financial 
products issued in the participating member states will be taxed even if the traders 
are not established in those countries (issuance principle).121 
 
In any case, this initiative is stranded in the Council and does not have prospects of 
success for the time being. During the most painful moments of the financial crisis, 
the popular support for this type of duty made some governments think that this 
                                                        
115 Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending 
Directive 2008/7/EC, Doc COM (2011) 594 final, 28 September 2011. 
116 Today only 10 member states continue with the negotiations after Estonia decided to quit the 
enhanced cooperation: France, Germany Belgium, Portugal, Austria, Slovenia, Greece, Spain, Italy 
and Slovakia. 
117 The UK questioned the legality of the enhanced cooperation alleging that it had extraterritorial 
effects and imposed costs on Member States which are not participating in this legislative 
procedure, but its action before the CJEU was dismissed basically on procedural grounds (judgment 
of the CJEU of 30 April 2014, UK v. Council, C-209/13). See also Bogdan Tasnadi et al., Financial 
Transaction Taxes in the European Union, European Commission Taxation Papers, Working Paper 
No 62, 2015, 11-13, available at https://www.steuer-gegen-
armut.org/fileadmin/Dateien/Kampagnen-Seite/Unterstuetzung_Ausland/EU/2015-
2016/1602_EU_Commission.pdf. 
118 Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial 
transaction tax, Doc COM(2013) 71 final, 14 February 2013 (FTT proposed Directive). See Jean-
Sébastien Pilczer, ‘Le parcours contentieux de la coopération renforcée en matière de taxe sur les 
transactions financières: la bataille de l’autorisation est gagnée, celle de la mise en œuvre reste { 
mener’, 50(3) Cahiers de droit européen 597-636 (2014); Federico Fabrini, ‘Taxing and Spending in 
the Euro Zone: Legal and Political Challenges related to the Adoption of the Financial Transaction 
Tax’, 2 European Law Review 155-175 (2014); Dieter Pesendorfer, ‘Financial Taxes and the Sand in 
the Wheels of Financialization: Legal Challenges for the EU Directive Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax’, 25(2) European Review of Public Law 619-
653 (2013). 
119 Also exempted from the FTT are Central Counter Parties, Central Securities Depositories, ECB, 
central banks of Member States, ESM and member states managing public debt (Article 3 FTT 
proposed Directive). 
120 Article 9 FTT proposed Directive. 




small tax could transmit the right symbolic message,122 without significant 
negative consequences for the attractiveness of their financial markets. However, 
the volatility and flexibility of capital markets (where transactions are easy to 
delocalize) and the pressure of the financial industry123 have sown doubt among 
the participating member states.124 The unanimity required has favored the 
blocking of the Directive several times by just one member state.125 
 
The deadlock at the European level has led several member states to develop 
national FTTs. After a first unsuccessful experience in Sweden126, it would appear 
as if the Italian127 and French128 FTT could show the way to other European 
countries in the future.129 A common characteristic of these regimes is the limited 
number of operations covered and the modest amount of state revenues that they 
produce. The whole picture is thus very distant from the promises of the ambitious 
Commission’s proposal of ‘ensuring that financial institutions make a fair and 
substantial contribution to covering the costs of the recent crisis (…) and creating 
                                                        
122 Daniela A. Kroll/ Dirk Leuffen, ‘Enhanced Cooperation in Practice. An Analysis of Differentiated 
Integration in EU Secondary Law’, 23(3) Journal of European Public Policy 353-363 (2015) 363. 
123 Lisa Kastner, ‘Business Lobbying under Salience – Financial Industry Mobilization against the 
European Financial Transaction Tax’, 25(11) Journal of European Public Policy 1648-1666 (2018). 
124 The scope of application of this tax has been progressively reduced during the negotiations in 
the Council, but some member states insist on reducing it further (e.g. Belgium wants to exclude 
from the tax base pension funds and insurances). The destination of the tax revenues also 
engenders debate: some point towards a Eurozone budget while others prefer them to feed 
national budgets. 
125 Belgium and Slovakia were blocking the agreement until April 2017 but since then only Belgium 
seems to oppose the adoption of the Directive (Marion Fontana, ‘Paris et Berlin proposent de 
relancer la taxe sur les transactions financières sur le modèle français’, Europe Daily Bulletin No. 
12151, 4 December 2017). 
126 Sweden was a pioneer in the implementation of a FTT in 1984. However, after constant 
amendments, the regime was abrogated in 1991 because the revenues were disappointing and the 
distortions in the financial market very relevant (important shares’ price drops and a dramatic fall 
in the volume of trade in bonds and futures markets). Most experts agree that the tax was easy to 
avoid and the regime promoted base erosion. See Steven R. Umlauf, ‘Transaction Taxes and the 
Behaviour of the Swedish Stock Market’, 32(2) Financial Economics 227–40 (1993). 
127 In 2013 Italy introduced its FTT levying a duty on 3 different operations: purchase of shares and 
similar instruments (0.1% or 0.2% depending on the transaction), derivatives, and cancelled or 
modified orders on high frequency trading (0.02%). Giuseppe Cappelletti/ Giovanni Guazzarotti/ 
Pietro Tommasino, ‘The stock market effects of a securities transaction tax: Quasi-experimental 
evidence from Italy’, 31 Journal of Financial Stability 81-92 (2017). 
128 The French FTT was introduced in 2012 and it covers the purchase of shares of French listed 
companies with a market capitalization above 1 billion euros (0.2%), uncovered credit default 
swaps on sovereign debt (0.01%) and cancelled orders in high-frequency trading (0.01%). See the 
critical report of the Cour de comptes, La taxe sur les transactions financières et sa gestion, Ref. 
S2017-1860, 19 June 2017, available at https://www.ccomptes.fr/sites/default/files/2017-
07/20170704-refere-S2017-1860-taxe-transactions-financieres-et-depenses-fiscales.pdf, and the 
criticism of Iryna Verizenko et al., ‘The impact of the French financial transaction tax on HFT 
activities and market quality’, 67 Economic Modelling 307-315 (2017); for a more positive 
perspective claiming that ‘the French FTT might provide pathways for a reduction in volatility 
without severely affecting trading volumes or liquidity’, see Sebastian Eichfelder/ Mona Lau/ Felix 
Noth, The impact of financial transaction taxes on stock markets: Short-run effects, long-run effects, 
and migration, arqus Discussion Paper, No. 228 (2018), available at 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/182540/1/1031254358.pdf. 
129 In January 2019, the Spanish government sent to the national Parliament a bill to establish a FTT 




appropriate disincentives for transactions that do not enhance the efficiency of 
financial markets’.130 
 
4.3. The rules for the remuneration of financial executives 
 
The astronomic figures achieved by financial executives’ salaries just before the 
2008 crisis caused public indignation. Some irresponsible and at times misleading 
trading131 that made a crucial contribution to market disruption had been 
rewarded with very generous bonuses based on short-term profits, independently 
of the long-term consequences of the transactions (not only for the economy but 
even for the financial firm involved). If salaries must reflect the social value 
generated by an economic activity, the criteria to determine financial executives’ 
salaries had been clearly distorted and did not reflect the social welfare derived 
from their performance. 
 
But apart from any moral considerations, the usual structure of this remuneration 
was found to be pro-cyclical and promoting financial bubbles and excessive risk. 
During the two decades preceding the 2008 crisis, a disproportionate growth of 
the variable pay (as compared to fixed pay) took place in the remuneration policies 
of financial executives. These incentives were usually calculated according to the 
short-term profit that they generated for their company. This wage system 
fostered risky (and sometimes purely speculative) transactions that produced big 
gains in the short-term regardless of the soundness of the operation and the long-
term consequences for the financial firm involved.132 The crisis made it possible to 
find consensus in the EU to consider the remuneration policies a question of 
systemic relevance that needed to be regulated as part of the risk evaluation of 
undertakings participating in the capital markets. 
 
Based on the ‘Principles for Sound Compensation Practices’ issued by the FSF 
(later FSB) in 2009,133 the Commission produced a Recommendation on the 
remuneration of directors of listed companies.134 The following year what is 
known as the Capital Regulation Directive III (CRD III)135 would introduce some of 
the rules in force today to legally frame the remuneration of financial executives in 
                                                        
130 Doc. COM (2013) 71 final, supra n. 118 at 2. 
131 Better Finance, A Major Enforcement Issue: the Mis-Selling of Financial Products, Briefing Paper, 
April 2017, available at 
http://betterfinance.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Research_Reports. 
132 For a review of the economic literature debating on the real influence of the financial firms 
executives’ pay structure on the management of risks, see Andenas/Chiu, supra n. 60, 360-366. 
133 Available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0904b.pdf. In 25 September 2009, the 
same body issued the ‘Implementation Standards for the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation 
Practices’ available at http://www.fsb.org/2009/09/principles-for-sound-compensation-practices-
implementation-standards/. 
134  Commission Recommendation 2009/385/EC of 30 April 2009 complementing 
Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of 
directors of listed companies (OJ L 120, 15 May 2009, pp. 28-31). 
135 Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading 
book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies (OJ L 329, 14 




credit institutions and investment firms.136 This regime would subsequently be 
refined in the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)137 and the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR),138 and developed in the ‘Guidelines on Sound 
Remuneration Policies’ issued by EBA in December 2015.139 
 
This regime has a systemic purpose (reducing the incentives for excessive risk 
taking to foster long-term welfare maximization) and therefore credit institutions 
and investment firms must apply it to all categories of staff ‘whose professional 
activities have a material impact on their risk profile’.140 Article 94 CRD IV 
regulates the variable element of the salary. Essentially, it is established that the 
variable component shall not exceed 100 % of the fixed component of the total 
remuneration of these executives. Exceptionally, a qualified majority of 
shareholders may authorize a higher percentage of the variable salary if it does not 
exceed 200% of the fixed salary.141 At least 50% of the variable remuneration shall 
consist of shares or share-linked instruments and at least 40 % of the variable 
remuneration (or 60% when the variable salary is particularly high) will be 
deferred over a period between 3 and 5 years. The deferred variable remuneration 
must be adaptable to reflect a potential negative performance of the financial firm 
and the total sum of variable remunerations cannot limit the ability of the 
institution to strengthen its capital base. Besides, discretionary pension benefits 
will be subject to a five-year retention period so that they are adapted to the long-
term financial health of the undertaking. 
 
Apart from the quantitative and qualitative limits on remuneration, CRD IV 
reinforced the control mechanisms of remuneration policies 142  and CRR 
established enhanced obligations of transparency.143 
                                                        
136 The Commission has recently proposed that only investment firms of systemic importance be 
subject to this remuneration regime in the future sponsoring the establishment of less onerous 
rules for smaller firms (Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the prudential supervision of investment firms and amending Directives 2013/36/EU and 
2014/65/EU, Doc. COM (791) final, 20 December 2017). 
137 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access 
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms (OJ L 176, 27 June 2013, p. 338–436). 
138 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (OJ L 176, 27 June 2013, p. 1–
337). 
139 EBA, Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under Articles 74(3) and 75(2) of Directive 
2013/36/EU and disclosures under Article 450 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Doc. 
EBA/GL/2015/22, 21 December 2015. 
140 Article 92 CRD IV. See also Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 604/2014 of 4 March 
2014 supplementing Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with 
regard to regulatory technical standards with respect to qualitative and appropriate quantitative 
criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on an 
institution's risk profile (OJ L 167, 6 June 2014, p. 30–35). 
141 This remuneration must be supported by ‘at least 66 % [of the shareholders/owners] provided 
that at least 50 % of the shares or equivalent ownership rights are represented or, failing that, [the 
remuneration needs to be authorized] by a majority of 75 % of the ownership rights represented’ 
(Articl4 94(1)(g)(ii) CRD IV). 
142 E.g. Article 92(2) CRD IV requires an annual independent internal review of remuneration 
policies and the staff engaged in these control functions must be independent from the business 





Convinced of the beneficial systemic effects of this remuneration policy and of the 
convenience of establishing a coherent regulation throughout the different 
segments of the financial market, the EU has extended this regime to asset 
managers with some adaptations. Noticeably, the fixed and the variable 
components of total remuneration must be ‘balanced’ but there is no maximum 
percentage of variable salary in proportion to the fixed salary; the period that a 
percentage of the variable remuneration is deferred may also be different.144 
Additionally, rules on remuneration governance have also been instituted for 
insurers, but they are slightly more flexible than for credit institutions and asset 
managers.145 Finally, Directive 2017/828 provides for an enhanced control of the 
remuneration policies by shareholders of all listed companies registered in a 
member state and operating in an EU regulated market.146 
 
In a refinement of this policy and in order to improve the protection of consumers, 
the EU has also regulated the salary of the staff providing retail banking services or 
selling insurance contracts to avoid productivity incentives that would foster 
practices that go against the client’s best interests.147 
 
The rules governing the remuneration policy of credit institutions and investment 
firms under CRD IV and CRR entered into force in 2014 and it is now possible to 
evaluate their result after several years. At the beginning, EBA had to eradicate 
                                                                                                                                                                  
143 Among other things, they must make public the ratios between fixed and variable remuneration 
or the number of individuals being remunerated by EUR 1 million or more per financial year 
(Article 450 CRR). 
144 See Article 13 and Annex II of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (OJ L 174, 1 July 2011, p. 1–73), 
and the ‘Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the AIFMD’ published by ESMA 2013 
(Doc. ESMA/2013/232) and amended in 2016 (Doc. ESMA/2016/579). See also Directive 
2014/91/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 amending Directive 
2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards depositary 
functions, remuneration policies and sanctions (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 186–213) and the 
‘Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the UCITS Directive’ (Doc. ESMA/2016/575, 14 
October 2016). 
145 Articles 275 and 294 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 of 10 October 2014 
supplementing Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ L 12, 17 
January 2015, p. 1–797), and guidelines 9 and 10 of the ‘Guidelines on System of Governance’ 
issued by EIOPA (Doc. EIOPA-BoS-14/253, 14 September 2015). 
146 Articles 9a and 9b of Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term 
shareholder engagement (OJ L 132, 20.5.2017, p. 1–25) (Lucia Ana Tomic/ Marko Zunic/ Suzana 
Audic Vuletic, ‘Upcoming Challenges on Regulating Remuneration of the Directors and 
Implementing Remuneration Policies’, V(2) Journal for International and European Law 323-344 
(2018). 
147 Article 24(10) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU (OJ L 173, 12 June 2014, p. 349–496), and Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution (OJ L 26, 2 




some tricks148 put in practice in certain entities to circumvent the variable 
remuneration limit and the UK unsuccessfully challenged the legality of the bonus 
cap before the CJEU.149 The reports published by EBA since 2014 show that the 
number of high earners (those awarded 1 million euros or more in annual 
remuneration) has increased or decreased slightly depending on the fluctuation 
between the euro and the pound sterling each year.150 However, there has been a 
constant decline in the percentage of variable remuneration in the total amount of 
salary since the entry into force of this policy.151 In sum, we have not seen a 
delocalization of activities taking into account that the EU enforces one of the 
strictest regimes of wage control in the financial sector in the global context.152 Pay 
levels have not been reduced but the structure of the remuneration has changed 
very significantly because financial firms have substantially increased the fixed 
component of the salary to keep their attractiveness for high executives when 
compared to other sectors of the economy. 
 
Since the objective of the reform was not reducing in quantitative terms the level 
of remuneration in financial firms but fostering the stability of the financial system 
(by discouraging excessive risk taking), this regulatory regime can be qualified as 
successful. Shareholders have more interest and improved instruments to control 
the salary of financial executives,153 the supervisory authorities obtain better 
                                                        
148 EBA issued an Opinion on 15 October 2014 discarding the consideration of role-based or market 
value allowances as part of the fixed component of the remuneration, among other clarifications 
(39 banks had not made correctly the calculation of the fixed salary). The definitive version of the 
Guidelines would be published in December 2015 (supra n. 139). 
149 The UK questioned the legality of this regime on several grounds that were dismissed by 
Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen in its Opinion of 20 November 2014, United Kingdom v. European 
Parliament and Council, C-507/13. The UK withdrew its application immediately after this Opinion. 
150 The UK is by far the country with more executives earning above 1 million euros and most of 
them are paid in pounds sterling. The exchange effect increased the number of millionaires when 
the pound appreciates vis a vis the euro and vice versa. They were 3.178 in 2013, 3.865 in 2014, 
5.142 in 2015, 4.597 in 2016, and 4.859 in 2017 (EBA Report on High Earners, 11 March 2019, 4, 
available at 
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2551996/Report+on+High+Earners+2017.pdf). 
151 The average of the variable component of the salary in relation to the fixed component for those 
earning EUR 1 million or more in annual remuneration was 317% in 2013 (when there was no 
bonus cap), 127% in 2014, 118% in 2015, 104% in 2016, and 101% in 2017 (EBA Report on High 
Earners, supra n. 150 at 8). 
152 The Obama Administration renounced establishing quantitative limits on the remuneration of 
financial executives in the USA and the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act [Pub.L. 111–203, 21 July 2010, H.R. 4173], available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/html/PLAW-111publ203.htm) only 
provides for certain procedural rules to improve financial institutions governance, such as the 
requirement to hold a non-binding shareholder advisory vote on the executives’ compensation 
programs, the creation of a board compensation committee whose members meet the 
independence standards set up by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
implementation of compensations recovery measures in certain circumstances (Steven E. Kaplan/ 
Valentina L. Zamora, ‘The Effects of Current Income Attributes on Nonprofessional Investors’ Say-
on-Pay Judgments: Does Fairness Still Matter?’, 153(2) Journal of Business Ethics 407–425 (2018); 
Sam Liu, The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Executive Compensation (31 January 2012), available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1996257). 
153 However, practice shows that shareholders very rarely question executives’ remuneration 
policies, and only do it in cases of bad economic performance of the financial firm (Jill Fisch/ Darius 
Palia/ Steven Davidoff Solomon, ‘Is Say on Pay All about Pay: The Impact of Firm Performance’, 8 




information and the remuneration regime fosters financial stability. Nevertheless, 
shifting the variable component of the remuneration to fixed salary with the semi-
automatic consent of the shareholders in times of bonanza does not necessarily 
improve risk management.154 At the end of the day, shareholders seek to maximize 
their profit and their interest in promoting financial stability is more mediated. 155 
The measures that defer the enjoyment of allowances and that adapt them to the 
long-term performance of the firm have more influence on the risk-taking 
decisions of financial executives than the variable salary cap. Besides, 
remuneration in this sector keeps on being inflated because it does not reflect the 
cost of the implied social insurance provided by the state both in recovery and 
resolution procedures and when the central banks provide very cheap liquidity to 




The reaction to the 2008 financial crisis in the EU has been based on ordo-
liberalism. The objective of keeping competitive financial markets and improving 
their stability was addressed through a meritorious legislative and institutional 
effort that has significantly increased state intervention in those markets to reduce 
moral hazard. This normative production was accompanied by promises to end the 
socialization of losses when financial institutions got into trouble. The popular 
indignation against the strain of resources dedicated to save financial firms (and 
deviated from other goals) received in this sense a certain response.  
 
However, the normative examples evaluated in this chapter show the 
shortcomings of this regulatory effort. The drafters of these norms have prioritized 
financial stability over the articulation of instruments that generate fairer 
distributional effects.157 The financial lobby has worked efficiently to block those 
aspects of reforms that could challenge the status quo more severely and damage 
the privileges of market participants over the rights of consumers and third 
parties. This has been facilitated by the traditional distance between financial rule-
makers and the mechanisms of democratic control, a phenomenon that also affects 
the European normative production. Groups of deceived citizens are turning to 
extremist political parties that capitalize their discontent after years of austerity 
measures and that work to delegitimize the European integration process with 
nationalist populist demagogy. 
 
                                                        
154 Andreas Kokkinis, ‘Exploring the Effects of the Bonus Cap Rule: The Impact of Remuneration 
Structure on Risk-Taking by Bank Managers’, 19(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 167-196 
(2019).  
155 Okamoto and Edwards have explained that it is impossible for the state to determine through 
regulation the optimal risk taking for financial enterprises (Karl S. Okamoto/ Douglas O. Edwards, 
‘Risk-Taking’, 32 Cardozo Law Review 159 (2010)). 
156 Dominic Quint/ Oreste Tristani, Liquidity provision as a monetary policy tool: the ECB’s non-
standard measures after the financial crisis, ECB Working Paper Series No. 2113, November 2017. 
157 John G. Glenn, Foucault and Post-Financial Crises. Governmentality, Discipline and Resistance 
(Palgrave 2019) 121-151; Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Typologies of solidarity in EU Law: A Non-
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The EU must defeat the perception that it imposes a form of governance that has 
been described as ‘executive federalism’ 158  or even ‘authoritarian 
manageralism’.159 The European integration process faces at present an existential 
crisis and is in urgent need of social re-legitimation. In order to achieve it, 
reinforcement of the democratic control of the financial normative output seems 
advisable, namely through an enhanced role for the European Parliament. If 
established institutions do not adequately respond to widely shared popular 
demands, the people end up questioning and replacing the institutions. 
 
The construction of efficient and coherent European capital markets cannot be 
achieved at the expense of the citizenry. Insofar as the bulk of social policy remains 
in the hands of member states, economic and monetary union and single market 
rules must respect the social choices behind the redistributive policies designed at 
the national level. In addition, the reinforcement of consumers’ rights and retail 
investors’ protection in the financial market could have a very beneficial result,160 
not only transmitting the benefits of a well-functioning market to the population, 
but also increasing the trust of households in the capital market (thereby 
augmenting the influx of money and consequently its depth and liquidity).161 
Consumer protection rules play in the market context a similar function as political 
and civil rights in the democratic context.  
  
Today there is a clear public awareness of the distributional effects of financial 
markets’ regulation and of its impingement on the social model.162 The EU must 
lead normative innovation in the reform of financial markets reinforcing those 
elements that allow recognizing it as a social market economy. It is a complex task 
because normative novelties must be compatible with an efficient functioning of 
the financial markets. Robust capital markets are necessary to uphold a 
competitive productive economy, and the latter is indispensable to sustain the 
European social model. The introduction of a financial transaction tax, or the 
regulation of financial executives’ remuneration, are positive steps in the right 
direction that may differentiate Europe from other parts of the world as regards 
the impact of financial markets’ regulation on the social model. The partial bail-in 
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160 See the Communication from the Commission ‘Consumer Financial Services Action Plan: Better 
Products, More Choice’, Doc COM (2017) 139 final, 23 March 2017. In parallel, the Capital Markets 
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Commission, Distribution Systems of Retail Investment Products across the European Union (2018), 
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(Routledge 2013) 117-140. 
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of troubled credit institutions and financial firms is also a necessary measure, but 
further research is needed to establish transparent and objective criteria to 
determine the degree of bail-in and bail-out to be applied in each operation. 
 
This European leadership in the reform of capital markets, if exercised, would give 
arguments to those who advocate that, for the time being, the EU constitutes the 
best showpiece for a future cosmopolitan and solidarity market economy in the 
context of globalization. 
